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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20020471-CA
vs.
WESLEY SCOTT WHITMORE,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
Appellant, WESLEY SCOTT WHITMORE ("Whitmore"), appeals the district
court's Orders dated August 14, 2001, February 25, 2002, and April 9, 2002, denying his
motion to withdraw guilty pleas or to declare a misplea, and the resulting Judgment,
Sentence, and order for Commitment dated May 14,2002. This Court has appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(d).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
ISSUE 1: Did the trial court err when it denied Whitmore's Motion to Withdraw
Guilty Pleas despite the undisputed fact that Whitmore was denied his right to counsel, as
provided by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, at such a
critical stage in the proceedings?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw
guilty pleas is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, "incorporating the clearly
erroneous standard for the trial court's findings of fact made in conjunction with that
decision." State v. Norris, 57 P.3d 238, 240 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (quoting State v.
Benvenuto. 983 P.2d 556 (Utah 1999).
ISSUE 2: Did the trial court err when it denied Whitmore's Motion to Declare a
Misplea despite the established fact that Whitmore's prior counsel rendered ineffective
assistance when he advised Whitmore that mistake as to an alleged victim's age was no
defense and therefore he should accept the State's plea offer?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A trial court's denial of a motion to declare a
misplea appears to be reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Kay, 717
P.2d 1294, 1305 (Utah 1986).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is an appeal from the judgment, sentence, and order of commitment
stemming from the trial court's denials of Whitmore's motions to withdraw his guilty
pleas and a motion to declare a misplea, all of which motions were grounded upon prior
counsel's ineffective assistance. On June 2, 2000, Defendant, Wesley Scott Whitmore,
was charged by Information with two counts of Unlawful Sexual Conduct with a 16 or 17
Year Old, both third degree felonies. On October 30, 2000, based upon the erroneous
advice of counsel, Richard Gale ("Mr. Gale"), Mr. Whitmore pleaded guilty to the
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Amended Information, two counts of Attempted Unlawful Sexual Conduct with a 16 or
17 year old, both class A misdemeanors.
More than 30 days later and upon realizing that he incorrectly advised Whitmore
at the time of entry of plea, Mr. Gale filed a Motion to Arrest Judgment and a Motion to
Withdraw Guilty Plea on March 7, 2001, on Whitmore's behalf (R. 41, 45). Mr. Gale
then withdrew because of the conflict created by his admitted ineffective assistance and
current counsel was appointed to represent Whitmore (R. 51). On June 14, 2001, in a
reply memorandum to the State's opposition, Whitmore further requested the trial court to
declare a misplea in the event that the trial court determined it was without jurisdiction to
consider Whitmore's motion to withdraw his pleas based upon the then misunderstood
30-day filing requirement1 (R. 66).
Oral arguments on the motion were held on June 21, 2001. At that time, current
counsel proffered Whitmore's testimony that although Whitmore believed the alleged
victim was over the age of 18, because Mr. Gale incorrectly advised Whitmore that
mistake as to the alleged victim's age was no defense to the charges, Whitmore accepted
the State's plea offer. It was also proffered that but for Mr. Gale's incorrect advice,
Whitmore would not have accepted the State's offer but would have proceeded to trial (R.
145, p. 4) (Transcript of Oral Arguments). Whitmore also provided the trial court with

^TAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6 (2)(b) provides that a motion to withdraw a guilty
plea must be made within 30 days after the entry of plea.
3

Mr. Gale's affidavit wherein it was established that Mr. Gale provided constitutionally
ineffective assistance at entry of plea (R. 71) (Affidavit of Mr. Gale, also attached as
Addendum A). This fact has never been disputed, and the trial court accepted
Whitmore's proffer and Mr. Gale's affidavit with no objection from the State.
In its Ruling dated August 14, 2001, the trial court denied Whitmore's Motion to
Arrest Judgment and Withdraw Guilty Plea on the ground that Whitmore's motion was
untimely under UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6 (2) (b) because it was filed more than 30
days after entry of plea. The trial court incorrectly concluded that it was without
jurisdiction to consider the motion. The trial court also stated that '"Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel' is not implicated in rule 11 and it has a separate remedy" (R. 79,
p.3). Further, despite Whitmore's proffered testimony on the record, the trial court
erroneously stated, "There is no affidavit from defendant, or testimony at hearing why he
entered his pleas to the reduced charges or why he wishes to withdraw his pleas" (Id. p.
4). This statement failed to account for Whitmore's proffered testimony during oral
arguments and the trial court's acceptance of that testimony (R. 148, p. 4).
In denying Whitmore's motion to declare a misplea, the trial court concluded
that there was no plain error because the "failure of counsel to notify a defendant of the
possible defenses to his or her charges is not something that would be 'obvious to the trial
court'" (Id. p. 5) (emphasis in original). The trial court also determined that there was no
manifest necessity to grant the motion to declare a misplea.
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Whitmore filed a Motion to Reconsider Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea on
September 13, 2001, based upon State v. Ostler. 31 P.3d 528 (Utah 2001), wherein the
Utah Supreme Court clarified that the 30-day filing requirement provided in UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-13-6(2)(b) did not begin to run until after sentencing. Consequently,
Whitmore's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas had been filed timely and the trial court
had jurisdiction (R. 91). In its February 25, 2002, Ruling denying that motion to
reconsider, the trial court determined that despite the admissions of Mr. Gale on the
record that he provided ineffective assistance at the entry of plea, Whitmore had "failed to
meet his burden of proof' because he had not provided a videotape or transcript of the
plea colloquy (R. 111, p. 3). Despite Mr. Gale's affidavit and Whitmore's proffered
testimony on the record establishing counsel's ineffectiveness, the trial court stated, "It is
the position of this Court that there may exist a separate, stand alone remedy for
'ineffective assistance of counsel' and an ineffective assistance of counsel' argument is
not automatically implicated. Whether it is implicated or not may depend upon the
record" (R. 111, p. 2) (emphasis in original).
On March 29, 2002, Whitmore filed a Motion to Reconsider the Court's Ruling
on Defendant's Motion to Reconsider Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, and
included the videotape of the plea colloquy with that motion (R. 118), although Whitmore
argued that the contents of the videotape were not necessary in light of the fact that Mr.
Gale's ineffective assistance had already been established by his affidavit and Whitmore's
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proffer. And as the trial court had previously conceded, "failure of counsel to notify a
defendant of the possible defenses to his or her charges is not something that would be
'obvious to the trial court'" (R. 79, p. 5) (emphasis in original). Nonetheless, on April 9,
2002, the trial court again denied Whitmore's motion on the grounds that he had "failed
to marshal sufficient evidence in the case and he has failed to meet his burden of proof'
(R. 124, p. 1).
Whitmore was then sentenced on May 14, 2002, which sentence included an
order for commitment to the Utah County Jail and 24 months probation. To the best of
counsel's knowledge, Whitmore has completed his commitment in this matter and is not
currently incarcerated.
RELEVANT FACTS
While investigating a report of possible illegal drug activity on or about May 21,
2000, officer Michael Turner of the Provo City Police Department made contact with
Emily Stone ("Stone"), the alleged victim in this case.2 According to the police report,
Ms. Stone was an individual with whom Officer Turner had contact on several prior
occasions. During the drug investigation, Ms. Stone allegedly told Officer Turner of a
sexual encounter with Whitmore that had occurred over 6 weeks previously while they
were getting prepared to travel together to Wendover.

2

These preliminary facts are contained in the police report but are not part of the
record. They are provided here to place the events in context.
6

On June 2, 2000, and as a result of Ms. Stone's allegations, Whitmore was
charged by Information with two counts of Unlawful Sexual Conduct with a 16 or 17
Year Old, both third degree felonies (R. 7). When Whitmore explained to his attorney,
Mr. Gale, that Ms. Stone had represented in the presence of various witnesses that she
was older than 18 years of age, Mr. Gale advised Whitmore that if Whitmore's mistake as
to Ms. Stone's age was a valid defense to the charges, he would recommend proceeding
to trial. Mr. Gale then erroneously explained that Whitmore's mistake as to the alleged
victim's age was no defense and therefore, Whitmore should accept the State's plea offer
(R. 71). Based upon this incorrect legal advice, Whitmore plead guilty to the Amended
Information, 2 counts of Attempted Unlawful Sexual Conduct with a 16 or 17 Year Old,
both class A misdemeanors.
On or about January 6, 2001, Mr. Gale learned that mistake as to the age of the
victim was in fact a valid defense to the charges when he read State v. Martinez, 14 P.3d
114, 119 (Utah 2000) (explaining that mistake as to a victim's age is a valid defense to
the charge of unlawful sexual conduct with a 16 or 17 year old). Mr. Gale stated in his
subsequently filed affidavit that he "wrongly advised Whitmore regarding his potential
defenses prior to him entering his plea of guilty . . . I do not believe that Whitmore had
the benefit of correct legal advice or that his plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily"
(R.71,p.3).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I. The trial court abused its discretion when it denied Whitmore's motions
to withdraw his guilty pleas; and the trial court's finding that Whitmore failed to meet his
burden of proof was clearly erroneous. That Whitmore was incorrectly advised by his
attorney and that he relied on that incorrect advice in accepting the State's plea offer is an
undisputed matter of record. Whitmore was entitled to but denied his constitutional right
to counsel at a critical stage in the proceedings. The State did not argue, nor did the trial
court find that prior counsel rendered constitutionally effective assistance, or that
Whitmore entered his pleas knowingly and voluntarily. Such undisputed deprivation of a
constitutional right constitutes sufficient good cause for the trial court to allow Whitmore
to withdraw his pleas as a matter of law.
Point II. Had the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider Whitmore's motion
to withdraw his pleas, which it did not, it should have granted Whitmore's motion to
declare a misplea. The ineffective assistance of Whitmore's counsel at entry of plea
constituted manifest necessity and obvious reversible error for purposes of declaring a
misplea, and there was no showing of undue prejudice to Whitmore.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
WHITMORE'S MOTIONS TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEAS.

"The purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a
defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the
8

proceeding." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984). A showing that
counsel was ignorant of the facts or the law constitutes ineffectiveness. State v.
McNichol 554 P.2d 203 (Utah 1976). Further, a defendant must be provided with
counsel at every important stage or hearing of the proceedings against him, meaning at
any hearing that may result in confinement. State v. Eichler, 483 P.2d 887 (Utah 1991).
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent part that a
court "may not accept the plea until the court has found . . . if the defendant is not
represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not
desire counsel." A defendant who chooses to plead guilty must enter such plea
voluntarily, knowingly, and with a full understanding of his rights and the consequences
of entering a plea. See, State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999) (explaining
that Rule 11 must be strictly complied with such that a defendant's guilty plea is knowing
and voluntary and "the defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional rights and
understood the elements of the crime") (citing State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah
1987)).
If the requirements of Rule 11 are not strictly complied with and the trial court
then "subsequently denies the withdrawal of the plea, the trial court has exceeded its
permitted range of discretion as a matter of law." State v. Mills, 898 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995). The primary purpose of Rule 11 "is to insure that when a defendant
enters a guilty plea and thereby waives important constitutional rights, such as the right to
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a jury trial, he or she acts freely and voluntarily with full knowledge of the consequences
of the plea." State v. Kay. 717 P.2d 1294, 1299 (Utah 1986). To that end, Rule 11
requires that a defendant "shall be represented by counsel before a plea is taken," unless
the defendant waives that right. Id- "Failure to inform a defendant of the nature and
elements of the offense is fatal to a guilty plea conviction." Id. (quoting State v. Pharris,
798 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Because entry of a guilty plea could (and in fact did) result in confinement,
Whitmore was entitled to counsel. And as the trial court noted, whether Whitmore had
effective assistance of counsel at entry of plea was not obvious from the plea colloquy.
Ineffective assistance is obvious, however, from Mr. Gale's affidavit, and was further
made manifest in Whitmore's proffered testimony. It is compelling that the trial court
never made a finding of effective assistance, nor did it or assert that Whitmore entered his
pleas knowingly and voluntarily. Rather, the trial court acknowledged prior counsel's
ineffective assistance and advised Whitmore that he had a separate remedy, presumably
civil, to address the deprivation of his constitutional rights. Counsel is aware of no legal
precedent that sanctions a court's deprivation of a defendant's constitutional rights during
a criminal proceeding on the basis that a civil remedy may be available on some future
day, after the defendant has been deprived of his liberty and due process of law. The trial
court ruled in effect that although Whitmore was admittedly deprived of an important
constitutional right, he could only seek redress via civil litigation. This position is
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without precedent and undermines basic constitutional safeguards during criminal
proceedings. Whether Whitmore also has a civil cause of action is irrelevant.
In summary, there is no dispute that Whitmore was entitled to effective
assistance of counsel at entry of plea. Further, counsel's ineffectiveness and that
Whitmore's plea was entered unknowingly and involuntarily, are undisputed facts on the
record. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion as a matter of law in denying
Whitmore's motions to withdraw his pleas.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
WHITMORE'S MOTION TO DECLARE A MISPLEA.

A court can rescind its acceptance of a guilty plea and "declare a mis[plea].. .
when an error occurs which will obviously compel reversal if the case is appealed, thus
making further proceedings futile." State v. Moss, 921 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1996)
(quoting State v. Kay, 717 P.2d at 1304-5). A court may rescind its acceptance of a guilty
plea at any time prior to sentencing, even several months after the fact, provided doing so
will not cause undue prejudice to the defendant and there is "manifest necessity." See,
State v. Horrocks. 17 P.3d 1145, 1149 (Utah Ct App. 2001) (explaining that the standard
for rescinding acceptance of a guilty plea is the same as for declaring a mistrial and
permits a trial court to declare a misplea at any time prior to sentencing). Circumstances
that would justify rescinding acceptance of a plea include "when accepting the plea is the
result of an obvious reversible error." Id.
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A defendant will not suffer undue prejudice as the result of a declaration of
misplea absent a showing that he "has taken some affirmative action which would
materially and substantially affect the outcome of [trial]." State v. Moss, 921 P.2d at
1027. A trial court may grant a misplea if doing so "restored both parties to their original,
pre-plea positions." Id. The key inquiry is whether the defendant "made an admissible
confession or made other incriminating statements in reliance on his plea which would
have substantially affected his [trial]". Id. It is not, however, appropriate for a trial court
to speculate about remote possibilities or weigh evidence that is not in the record and may
not even be admissible when making a determination of whether a defendant would be
unduly prejudiced, as the trial court did in this case.
The act of setting a plea aside or of declaring a misplea is distinct from a trial
court's granting of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. A trial court may rescind its
acceptance of a guilty plea at any time prior to sentencing based upon an obvious
reversible error. Assuredly, a defendant should not be subjected to a more stringent
standard than the State when there is an obvious error that makes his plea invalid,
particularly when a court will so find in further wasteful proceedings. It is appropriate for
a trial court to rescind its acceptance of a guilty plea when there is an obvious reversible
error that will make further proceedings futile and merely prolong and delay the judicial
process, as is the case here.
In this case, it is undisputed that Whitmore was denied his Sixth Amendment
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right to counsel during entry of plea. With Mr. Gale's affidavit attached hereto as
Addendum A becoming part of the record, the error became obvious and neither the trial
court nor the State argued otherwise. Moreover, Mr. Gale filed the initial motion to
withdraw Whitmore's pleas based upon his own admitted ineffective assistance. Further,
there is no question that Whitmore wajs entitled as a matter of law to be represented by
counsel at entry of plea. He never waived that right. The undisputed fact that he was
denied that right certainly constitutes manifest necessity for purposes of declaring a
misplea. Moreover, further proceedings were futile because it was established that
Whitmore did not enter his pleas knowingly and voluntarily, and therefore, his pleas were
not valid. The trial court's speculative discussion in its August 2001 Ruling about
hypothetical and possible prejudice to Whitmore resulting from a misplea was
inappropriate. The trial court made no finding that Whitmore made an admissible
confession or other incriminating statements in reliance on his plea which would
substantially affect his trial, which is the appropriate standard.
Accordingly, the trial court erred when it denied Whitmore's motion to declare a
misplea.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing facts and law, Appellant, Wesley Scott Whitmore,
respectfully requests this Court to vacate his convictions in this case and to find that the
trial court abused its discretion when it denied Whitmore's motions to withdraw his guilty
pleas and his motion to declare a misplea.
Respectfully submitted this

day of January, 2003.

U.

Jennjjfer K. Gc
owans
Attorney for Defendant
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH,

AFFIDAVIT

Plaintiff,

Case No. 001402276

vs.
Judge Lynn W. Davis
WESLEY WHITMORE,
Defendant.

County of Utah

)
:

State of Utah

ss.

)

COMES NOW, Richard P. Gale, who, upon being duly sworn, deposes and says:
1. My name is Richard P. Gale. My date of birth is April 29, 1968. I am an attorney
licensed to practice law in the State of Utah.
2. I am presently employed by the Utah County Public Defender's Association and was
so employed in June of the year 2000.1
3. In early June of 20001 was assigned a client by the name of Wesley Whitmore.
Whitmore was charged with two counts of Unlawful Sexual conduct with a 16 or 17 year old, a
Third Degree Felony. Upon reviewing the police report I discovered that Whitmore had admitted
to having sexual relations with a 17 year old female.

4. On August 28, 20001 met with Whitmore at the Fourth District Court to discuss the
case. Whitmore told me that he believed that the victim was over the age of 18 due to her
appearance and behavior and that at the time he had sexual intercourse with her he believed the
victim to be a consenting adult.
5. I told Whitmore that his mistake as to the victim's age was not a defense to this crime.
6. On October 30, 2000, Whitmore and I attended a Preliminary Hearing on his case in
the Fourth District Court infrontof Judge Lynn W. Davis. At the Preliminary Hearing the state
offered to reduce the charges to Class A misdemeanors if Whitmore would plead guilty to the
charges rather than proceed to trial.
7. After considering the plea offer made by the state I advised Whitmore that he should
plead guilty. I told Whitmore if his mistake as to the age of the victim was a defense I believed
that he would prevail at trial. I then told Whitmore because his mistake as to the victim's age
was not a defense he would likely be convicted of the felony offenses at trial.
8. After considering my advice Whitmore waived his right to jury trial pled guilty to two
counts of Attempted Unlawful Sexual Conduct with a 16 or 17 Year Old, class A misdemeanors.
9. On approximately January 6, 2001, while reading the case of State v. Martinez, 14
P.3d 114, 119 (Utah 2000), I learned that a defendant's mistake as to the age of a victim, though
not a defense to the crimes of Rape of a Child and Unlawful Sexual Intercourse, is however a
defense to the crime of Unlawful Sexual Conduct with a 16 or 17 Year Old.
10. I learned that State v. Martinez did not create new law, but simply highlighted the
difference between crimes which deal with victims younger than 16 and crimes which deal with
victims older than 16. I learned that section 76-2-304.5(2) of the Utah code does not preclude a
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defendant's mistake as to age of the alleged victim from being claimed as a defense in the crime
of Unlawful Sexual Conduct with a 16 or 17 Year Old with which Whitmore was charged.
11. On January 8, 2001, Whitmore and I attended his sentencing hearing in Fourth
District Court. I informed Judge Lynn W. Davis that I had wrongly advised Whitmore regarding
his possible defenses and that Whitmore would be moving to withdraw his plea of guilty to the
misdemeanor offenses. Judge Davis continued the sentencing and set a day for a motion hearing.
12. I subsequently conflicted the case to another attorney because Whitmore would be
required to claim that I was ineffective and did not give him correct legal advice.
13. I do now affirm that I wrongly advised Whitmore regarding his potential defenses
prior to him entering his plea of guilty to Attempted Unlawful Sexual Conduct With a 16 or 17
Year Old. I do not believe that Whitmore had the benefit of correct legal advice or that his plea
was entered knowingly or intelligently.
DATED f \

Day of June, 2001

I hereby certify that on the I « day of June, 20011 read the above statement in its entirety and
that it is true, complete, and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

Affiant
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//

Subscribed and sworn to before me this jj__ Day of

£45 N. UN! 1 /. AVE.
Pf:CV0: UTAH »4€i3J

GOVM.fcXP ': 7-?0O4

4

Q^^,

^^Zr-Zg,
~v
Notary Public

., 2001.
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